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??????????????

1. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????“??”??“??”???????????

2. ???????????????????????????????“??-??”??????????????????????

3. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????“???”????????????????“?????????”?????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ????????????????

4. ??????????? ????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????“??”????“??”???????

Read ????? (1 and 2) after Steve C recommended it. He asked me whether I can still “handle” China but I was interested in the central-local relationship.

The book is similar to a pretty stylized mini TV series: bad guys are bad all around and good guys are good inside out, “????”, etc. And there isn’t as much discussion of central-local tensions till the 2nd series, which, when it comes to that, is very revealing:

 ???????????????????????????????1994?????????????????1994???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

Also, according to the book, the central transfers are often NOT included in local’s budgets! No wonder ????? become so prominent and prevalent.

Two years ago, I’d thought this is abnormal and is something that can be amended by policy or institutional design. Now, I don’t think so any more: the central-local tension is part of China political economy that is beyond regime or even civilization (????????????????????????????????????????????????????)

There is certainly an institutional design component: one may argue that focus on GDP, including the bias toward growth in cadre evaluation, calls for locals to game the system. Therefore, however hard the center tries, it still can’t make ?????–even when provincial heads are centrally appointed.

But defects in institutional design do not explain prevalent corruption. Not even the misaligned center-local interests can explain that. In other words, you can have very clean local officials who still undermine national economy in pursuit of local interests.

Corruption seems to be best explained by property rights (and its principal-agent implication). A national economy has a certain amount of endowed assets–land, natural resources or labor that can only be mobilized politically. The marketization of those assets is often a monopolized process (because the assets are considered public), particularly when there is a pretty strong government (i.e. an agent of public interests).

The natural conclusion is that it is an ill that cannot be solved by political reform alone (e.g. corrupt but democratic countries like India). It may solve the agency problem but certainly not the rights ill.

But how can one privatize public assets and keep them efficiently deployed without creating injustice? I think this is the real question. Is Norway a possible exception to this? I really need to study the Scandinavian countries more …

Book: The Origins of Totalitarianism

To put it harshly, The Origins of Totalitarianism is more like a political manifesto than a scientific thesis. The locus of Arendt’s work is the Holocaust hence the applicability and reasoning are rather questionable.

Arendt is not just any Jewish survivor. A student and a lover of the preeminent 20th century philosopher, Martin Heidegger, Arendt had rightfully consider herself a member of the upper echelon of the the Western civilization before, suddenly, she was nearly cannibalized by it. Therefore, for Arendt, the most pressing question for her was “what has gone so wrong”?

In pursuit of an answer to this question, Arendt chooses to forgo the cultural and historical peculiarity of the German nation but to extrapolate a general condition which she argues could forster a monsterous extremist regime.

A central character in her definition of Totalitarianism is the movement’s global aspiration. The existence of an ideology aiming for world domination (quotes needed) is a prerequisit. Although such a framework explains well Nazism and Communism, it fails to explain racial or ethnic triggered mass hysteria. Even today, as what used to be unthinkable in America (p 420 a country least exposed to mass psychology) becomes legal (e.g. warrantless surveillance, suspension of habeas corpus, etc.), what the silent majority buy into is not a desire of world domination or salvation but “homeland” security.

Does Totalitarianism exist as one of the “-ism” of the 20th century? Or even, is there a “sin test”–I know it when I see it–of Totalitarianism? If mass murder of the innocent is a inevitable outcome of a Totalitarian regime, as Arendt suggests, the evidence in the late 20th century offers little support–one can hardly say that what happened in Rwanda and Bosnia were perpetrated by totalitarian regimes.

In other words, mass murder cannot happen unless the entire society goes along with a few fanatics. In her book, the chapter on “the classless society” is the one that I can relate to the most: fanaticism is possible when there is a breakdown of social orders (class not in the traditional Marxist sense). But even a chaotic social order is a necessary condition, it is clearly not a sufficient one. For Industrialization and Republicanization (French style) were both traumatic events in history yet not all societies lived through them became radical as did the German, Russian and Chinese nations. In France, the Dreyfus case–as extensively discussed by Arendt–is a case in point: there was clearly a suffocating antisemitic sentiment at the beginning, but it fizzled as quickly as it started (quotes needed).

Therefore, given similar social conditions, given that political and psychological manipulation is innate to human beings as there are demagogues in every historical period in every society, why some nations degerated into totalitarianism, but some did not?

Or, to put the question differently, if there exists a transcendent Totalitarian model, why did it not manifest itself every where, every time? Arendt herself in the 1950 preface says that she wrote the book “out of the conviction that it should be possible to discover the hidden mechanics by which all traditional elements of our political and spiritual world were dissolved into a conglomeration”. Yet even after she seems to have identified many, if not all, of those mechanics, she has yet to convince me that the existence of those mechanics along is enough to breed Totalitarianism.

After the Holocaust, man finds itself still capable of watching massacres unfold in Rwanda and Balkan, and mass hysteria reign in North Korea and, most recently, South Africa. It appears that if history is of any guidance, what Arendt labels as “hidden mechanics” are not that “hidden” compared to something deeper underlying every holocaust.

My observation is that the likelihood of Totalitarianism is negatively related to the liberal tradition of a society. The liberal tradition refers to not only the depth but also the breadth of its societal penatration. In other words, a society that features a clan of intelligentsia and a huge disparity is as illiberal as one that features an undereducated mass.

During the oral defense of my paper, Prof. Chirot asked a question he’d asked us before, “would you call the nationalist sentiments in China, Korea or Vietnam ‘nationalism’”? I thought I answered it rather well: nationalism in its purest form is a Western concept. I am leaning more toward Hans Kohn (”Idea of Nationalism”) and Gellner (”Nations and Nationalism”) that nationalism is a product of the Enlightenment and/or Industrialization. It is associated with the secularization and democratization movement in the 18th and 19th century. With regard to the national identity present among East Asian polities, I stated those should not be labeled “nationalism” because “a body of knowledge only becomes so if it worked. Otherwise, it is just another experiment”.

That is what I implied in the Caribbean paper, that is, nation building does not end with declaration of independence. To expand it further, I don’t think German and Japanese nation building should be labeled as instances of nationalism, since their nation building exercises lead both to path of (self-)destruction. The polities resulted were still monarchical and authoritarian.

In short, my answer to Chirot’s question is not a teleological statement, rather it is a historicist one.

I am also reading Ann Anagnost’s “National Past-Times: Narrative, Representation, and Power in China”. She frequently cited the national narrative in post-colonial countries as references. I wonder whether she’s bought into the structuralist argument of nationalism. But I have to finish reading it first. It is not an easy read by the way–I can re-write her Introduction part with phrases much easier to understand. For example, instead of saying China has large regional differences and varying ethos in recent times, she uses terms like “spatial and temporal” this and that. Scary, scary.

Notes:

noblesse oblige: Benevolent, honorable behavior considered to be the responsibility of persons of high birth or rank
[no-Bless ob-LEE-dge]

Nothing in particular, just some thoughts today:
1. Finished Blustein’s “And the Money Kept Rolling in (And Out)”. His main theme? Too much liquidity is bad for a small developing economy.

Note liquidity is not just “hot money”, as the term is highly charged and predisposed against currency trading (as Jesus would do). Instead, liquidity means zero-friction convertibility.

His proposed solution? If market is addicted to a quick buck, then impose an sovereign bankrupcy protection scheme that is enforced by international laws and institutions (e.g. IMF). Call it the Chapter 11 procedures for nations. It incurrs a mandatory suspension and restructuring of a nation’s debt. According to the author, some creditors were begging the Argentinians to organize such a “hair cut” across the board during the crisis.

The chance of his idea becomes a reality? Very small I am afraid. The creditors can easily influence the U.S. decision makers while the developing nations can’t.

2. Movies:
The Lives of Others (Das Leben der Anderen). A good movie that I’d recommend to others. Worthy of the Best Foreign Movie recognition. Other than the Dreyman character, everyone performs well. However, I am not sure whether the movies is trying to tell a story or to leave an impression. Its linear progression leaves little room for any explosion. The closest is Christa’s suicide–a perfect moment to paint a torn body and soul. Yet the shots on the blood, the twisting body and her last words are short, tentative and restrained. What is more, Dreyman’s devastation and the exposure of Wiesler in front of his boss are compartmentized. Now instead of having to face an angry lover and a furious master, Wiesler is totally out of picture. How about that for a bang?

Then I watched the Madness of King George III again–always one of my favorites. Love the performance–everyone: the King, Pitt, Fox, etc. Unlike the Germans who like to use lighting and cinematographic composition to tell a story, the British are actors. They use body language, facial expression and catchy dialogue to “shake” you into feel something. The screen writer tried somewhat half-heartedly to circumscribe the significance of KGIII’s illness (e.g. American independence). They don’t have to, because the way the actors act makes an audience think the significance is already known to them and is irrelevant. Now that is art.

3. The Democratic Congress
Usually, I don’t care for what is going on in D.C. any more. But noticed that recently the Democrats are having trouble getting their agendas into law. It really came to no surprise to me. A short while ago, I commented on the difference between being politically liberal and ideologically liberal.

The problem with the Democrats is that they politik too much and govern too little. Either by nature or by design, they are more of agitators than administrators. That is very unfortunate. Since some of them are pretty brilliant and progressive.

The second failed attempt to pass SCHIP and the decision to roll everything into a defense bill are just a few examples (if Clinton ever did something, it is an exceptions (given eight years) that proves the rule). They fail to see the value of their causes can only be realized if the legislations are enacted (i.e. in the governance domain), not when they are held as political hostages (i.e. in the political domain).

I have been reading Paul Blustein’s “And the Money Kept Rolling in (And Out)”. The book tells the story of the 2001 Argentina default and subsequent IMF intervention.

From the journalistic point of view, the book is not quite as good as his first one on Asian crisis in 97 (The Chastening), which is full of anecdotal accounts of key players during the crisis (for example, Taiwan’s central banker decided to devalue TW dollar while playing golf with his Korean counterpart, who sensed something was about to happen but didn’t know what when the Taiwan guy whispering Chinese into his cell phone). It was as if Ken Burns shot a documentary on Watergate.

This book is somewhat duller but has more insight in international economics. It tells a much more coherent story on how domestic policies (i.e. fiscal policy) drives trade and currency valuation.

I had this discussion with Migdal (I admire the man but he needs a econ upgrade) and most recently in class with a fellow student: who is to blame for currency crisis? My arguemnt is: it is the fiscal policy that is at fault. In other words, currency devaluation is just the consequence of inflation. Currency speculation is a byproduct, NOT the culprit.

Blustein certainly started out hoping to make a case against the moneymen on the Street. But as he progresses, he finds the Argentinian government the most to blame. The whole country is addicted to deficit spending and the political system is configured to keep it that way.

For example, its federal system means the provinces can borrow money without federal consent. Its Peronist tradition (i.e. Latin American populism) gives labor unions a disproportionally large role in policy decisions. Also, a powerful government means temptation of corruption and personal ego: often a President does not want to leave office and finds ways to buy his votes/time through government spending.

Since 2001, the Argentinian economy is on a fast recovery. However, I just came across this article on WSJ, “Economic Reckoning Looms In Argentina’s Election“, which says that the recovery is riddled with high inflationary risk:
“(Its current President) has ramped up spending, helping to fuel inflation. The government’s fiscal surplus is rapidly shrinking due to subsidies for energy, as well as goodies for pensioners, some public-sector workers and other key constituencies. There are also inflationary pressures from the higher international prices for Argentine agricultural commodities, which are blowing back to cash registers at home.”

The article did not mention the capital account or currency reserve level. One of the problem in 2001 was that the governments borrowed too much foreign debt to finance its spending. The focus of the article is the government’s price control practice.

I am interested to see how such an anti-investment policy will work. It is not a contractionary policy but almost like selective punishment. It has been working in China (I think so until I am proven wrong), will it work for Argentina?

Keywords: lust, confusion, Ang Lee, Eileen Chang, Mérimée, Kundera, MacBeth

??????????????????·????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Prosper Mérimée??”Mateo Falcone”?????Milan Kundera?? “The Unbearable Lightness of Being”?????MacBeth?

????????????????????????????????“??”??????“???????”??????????????????????“???????”???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????“???????”???????????????????

???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????“??”?????“??????????????????????????”??

?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????“????????????????????????????????????????????”

?????????????????????????????????????????????”Mateo Falcone”???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????“????????????????????????????????????????”????Falcone??????“Do we have a son?” ???????????????????????????????“?????????”???????????????????????????????????????“??????????”??????????

?????????????????????·??????????“Lust, Caution”?Lust????Caution???????, ??Abstention??Severance???????????????????????????? (à la Dangerous Liaisons)? ???“?”?

?????????MacBeth???MacBeth?????????????????????????MacBeth??????????????????????????????????????

MacBeth????????“??”???“??”?????????????MacBeth?Sovereignty???????????????????????????????????Banquo????????

And often times, to win us to our harm,
The instruments of darkness tell us truths,
Win us with honest trifles, to betray’s
In deepest consequence.

??????????????????????????????????????????????????????

?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????, ????????????????????????????????????

????????????

??????“????”???????????????????????????

Finally done with Foucault’s Discipline and Punish. I don’t think I can take on another heavyweight this summer. Maybe some contemporary stuff before school starts.

I thought I had the whole book figured out until I hit the last chapter (Prison). The slew of concepts like delinquency vs. illegality–all in pretty plain terms but are given vastly different interpretations–are pretty overwhelming. There, M.F. veers off a methodical and articulate style that marked the earlier chapters, and becomes somewhat rhetorical and self-indulging (IMHO).

After I put down the book, trying to think of a theme for a review, I got so tired and almost fell in sleep in the bathtub. The challenges are:
1. I don’t know which dialogue (metaphorically speaking) this book is written for
2. I can’t identify a central “why” question of the book (related to 1)
3. I have read too many interpretations prior to reading the original text

I am not sure this is a giant’s shoulder I am able to stand on or just look up to …

A recent article indicates that rates among nonofficial banking outlets in WenZhou, China has lowered by 30% (?????????400?????????)

I have been interested in alternative banking in China, knowing that the stage of economic development needs more fluid capital flow but the official banks cannot provide that. The alternative banking, I thought, would be an interesting specimen to study: in it, one could see some of the “capitalist sprouts” Chinese historians have been talking about. Also, it would be interesting to see whether it could pose a challenge to the central authority, or change social economic behaviors (e.g. civic association, credit-trust system, etc.)

At the recommendation of Christine Wong, I bought a book called Back-Alley Banking: Private Entreprenuers in China . It is an interesting book because the author did extensive field work in China (23 month). It is probably the best resource in this field. However, the author has a rather strange view point: in the introduction, she mentioned how her study could prove the institutional economy (or state-directed economy) wrong (e.g. Douglas North). But her research has not proven private banking could fund large scale capital adventures. Buying houses or coal mines, as the WenZhou capitalists have done, needs mainly financial capital. But financial capital alone is not enough to catapult a national economy to a different stratosphere, or the Saudis would have been king of the world now.

In other words, had her study been how backalley banking changed Korean economy–the one most used as an example of state-directed development, her conclusion would be much more relevant.

Now back to the recent WenZhou article. It was poorly written: full of information, little knowledge. The author did not try to speculate whether the regression was temporary or an indication of a new trend. But one interesting thing I found was:
“?????????????????????????? … ??????????????????????????????????????????????????“?????”???”

It looks like the official banking system is improving: more products, better/more efficient services. But is it because the competition or administrative directive from the central government? As Yoda said, “Hard to see.”