lisasong.com

Went to Max and Stephanie’s wedding in Quincy, WA.

Here is what I said on my album log:

Two beautiful people I know got married. Max and Stephanie finally tied the knot on 2008.9.13. It was a lovely day, the ceremony was held in a romantic setting–in a vineyard overlooking the Columbia. Seeing the two being together for three years now, I was nevertheless very moved when they read their wedding vows. For a moment, I regretted any cynism I had in social rituals.

Quincy is a pretty place: the color, the solitude and the scale always remind me of autumn, my favorite season of a year. Song and I both love the place.

The Sunserra resort, however, is a different story: underwhelming buildings, excess grassy lawns and stringent behavioral codes: you shall not curse or you will be fined.

Also, met some interesting people there. One couple from Luxemburg: Maria is German, Jeff Welsh. The lady works at European Commission’s nuclear regulatory advisory agency at Brussel. We chatted a lot about European affairs, e.g. Belgium, Germany’s coal and steel regions.

The conversation led to the topic of legislative process in EU. I was surprised to learn that the binding EU laws were drafted by Ministers from member countries, something I thought would be a big no-no in the States. Maria also asked, “so what’s the legislative process in China?”

The conversation was cut short but I left wonder about the difference between the two unions: EU and China. It is my speculation that the two are quite opposite of each other in one regard at least:

EU is a bunch of sovereign polities with a strong desire to “act together”. China is a bunch of legally unified politiies with a constant tendence to “act different”.

Is this correct?

Denis is kind enough to engage me on an earlier post. It took me days to write replies. Nevertheless, I am pretty happy I was able to wrap my arm around this issue.

I don’t have too many things I can call “labor of love”. This is certainly one of those. After writing the last one, I am so exhausted that I didn’t want to think about it any more.

Anyway, here it is:
Denis

After reading your last email and my previous one, I realized that I did not make myself clear why I brought up those country cases. What I wanted to say is that people are too accustomed to a stylized way to look at things (oppressors vs. liberators, right vs. wrong, etc.), but may have missed some of the obvious questions which, in fact, outline the dynamics of power politics in a way that scientists use to demonstrate invisible forces.

I recognize that I probably went out of my league when I tried to cover too many cases, e.g. Northern Ireland. What is more, although I had a common theme behind all those questions, I did not spell out the theme for you (as I mentioned earlier). Hence, the cases may have appeared as irrelevant or unrelated to each other.

But they are not. The common theme behind all those questions is that what is unfair may not be unjust. What is fair may not be righteous (e.g. European anger). It is a mistake to consider fairness or
righteousness in a vacuum. Once you factor in power relations the real picture is a lot different from a superficial, stylized impression.

To put it more bluntly, I do not believe there is a universal, INVIOLABLE code of conduct. If I am not mistaken, this thinking is what really abhorred you and led you to comment that “I transposed your logic to other contexts in an effort to reveal how frightening your thinking is if you follow it through”.

In fact, I am aware of the heaviness of my logic. I call myself a cynic not because I use it as a “hedge” to defuse the disappointment I feel when real life turns out much darker then I wished for. No. I do believe in my logic. I think that is the gist of our differences. I reject the promise of a Positivist world view. If such a view may be thought of as the legacy of a Continental tradition that began with Comte or Kant, I belong to a different camp—that of the Anglo-American Empiricist/Pragmatist school. I assumed that you are a liberal particularly because I detected the idealist element in your reasoning.

I should really take a pause here for we are now talking more about beliefs than reason. If I offended you by labeling you, I do apologize in advance. But you must believe me when I say I don’t mean “idealism” in a mocking way. When I use the word, I don’t use it in the vernacular sense (i.e. hot-headed hippy). Rather, it is the foundation of an alternative world view.

This being said, I just can’t find myself subscribe to this world view—it is not valid, nor is it operation-able. Not valid in the sense that it is not backed up by real world events. Not operation-able in
the sense that such a world view cannot be translated into substantial, course-altering action.

Let’s begin with the first point. In almost every case we discussed, there is a significant and enduring (if not permanent) gap between what it should/ought to be and what actually happened. This is the
same thing as the fairness-justice difference I mused about earlier. It is one thing if the discrepancies (between an envisioned world and the real one) appear occasionally and randomly. It is another if they
happen all the time. In other words, when the world always turns out dramatically different from what you think it should be, what should you think—”what is wrong with the world” or “what is wrong with my belief”? For example, after the British abolished slavery, some enlightened English wondered aloud why the Americans didn’t follow their example. After the Americans finally assimilated the Indians, they are now offended when Chinese started to compare the Tibetan issue to the Natives. The arguments were similar—we made the mistake, we know we were wrong. But you shouldn’t repeat our mistakes! You see, it is as if there is a Platonic world out there. However, again, when reality repeatedly violates the Ideal, should you still believe in the sanctity of the Ideal?

On the second point, that the idealist belief is not operation-able, I want to stress that I mean “course-altering” operations. In the case where the Taliban decided to blow up Buddhist statues, there was no lack of consensus on “right” or “wrong”. Yet was that consensus alone sufficient to alter the course of history? Then there is an even more extreme example in the cannibalistic Idi Amin, who, despite being nearly universally condemned, died in the hands of time not man. I raise those examples not to upset your senses or to distract from our discussion. Instead, what I am trying to say here is that the moral outrage (or the appeal of the righteousness) **alone** is rather powerless.

Not that I don’t believe one should hold any sort of standard. In fact, I can’t bring myself to say that “humanity” is an empty word. At the same time, however, I realize that such a standard (same as what you mean by “value system”) works only on those who also believe in such a standard and in a relatively limited sphere (geographical as well as cultural) that is also aligned with raw power (not in the sense of delivering physical violence, but the ability to change course of history). Actually, the raw power needs the standard as much as the other way around. Because people inherently seek transcendental meanings in their daily labor, the significance of symbol, ritual and language are often just as powerful. In short, they are symmetrically important and mutually enhancing (think of Weber’s Protestant ethics thesis and Said’s Orientalism. But there is a lot more to that per
sociologists like Dirkheim, Bourdieu and Geertz).

It is because this realization or, more precisely, because I am more sensitive to this power-discourse relationship than to the universality of human rights, that I claimed supporting Tibetan independence is the same as challenging China. When I said “every … is a racist”, I was following Said’s statement which, if I dare to speculate, is modeled after Nietzsche’s claim “God is dead”—it is not about whether God is really dead or not, but a cry to shock the ready (but still wandering) minds into attention.

I also take exception with your characterization of my argument on Tibet: I said the Chinese government is violently suppressive only when it comes to Dalai Lama. I am also disappointed that you, as a Tibetan specialist, didn’t give the Chinese government more credit for its respect of Tibetan culture.

To the first point, I would say that, first, I have read Dalai’s autobiography in Chinese. He is no Desmond Tutu or Nelson Mandela. His view of the world is not lack of ethnic discrimination. Secondly,
because Dalai is the head of a political party that openly advocates Tibetan independence, I consider the tension between Dalai and Beijing not a religious-secular confrontation as widely portrayed in the
Western news media, but a secular power struggle. It is not as if Dalai and Beijing disagree on what is the proper way to prostrate, it is who to prostrate to. I am not saying all power struggles are
equally dirty. But if the world recognizes Beijing’s sovereignty over Tibet, it is Beijing’s prerogative to consolidate political power across the land. If the debate comes down to that the Tibetans choose
theocracy but the Chinese government decide to untie politics and religion by marginalizing Dalai Lama, the West is really in no place to comment on that.

To the second point, I would say Beijing has done what is reasonable for Tibet. You should know that central transfer to Tibet far exceeds resource extraction from Tibet, at least since the 2000s. The notion that China proper is pillaging a resource-rich Tibet is just a slander. I have come across Barry Sautman’s several articles on Beijing’s dealings in Tibet. I don’t know what you think of him, but
he told me things I wasn’t aware before. As a Chinese native now living in the States, I do read China’s defense on its Tibet policy. What Sautman did was to collaborate some of the assertions made by the Chinese government and regular citizens.

If you are a Tibetan specialist, I don’t need to tell you how complicated Sino-Tibetan history has been. The mistrusts, hostilities and conflicts have been there for centuries and, more importantly,
gone both ways. Therefore, today’s ethnic tension and political struggle in Tibet is not unprecedented. It is not like China suddenly decide to invade an innocent Shangri-La where people eat nothing but
organic and practice nothing but yoga. Of course, I don’t believe the other nonsense that Tibetans were slaves to the Lamas prior to 1950. Even if it were true, Han Chinese really have no business to pass judgment, particularly when many contemporary Han Chinese lived no better.

What really happens in Tibet today must be somewhere in between. We don’t know the truth not because we don’t have access to the facts (even the Chinese news lockout cannot prevent cell phone pictures being leaked out on the Internet), but because our perception has been heavily colored by what we like to believe. You keep saying that you are not ardently pro-Tibet. But this is so relative that, as the recipient of this assurance, I still have no idea how far apart we are.

I was infuriated by some of the obvious media lies on Tibet during the height of the tension. You probably have heard (and I saw them myself) that Washington Post used pictures of Nepal police beating up Tibetan protestors as proof of Chinese brutality. CNN cropped a picture where
Tibetan protestors were the aggressors attacking a military truck to tell a complete different story. Many Chinese charged that the Western media conspired to make China look bad. I think that is too simplistic a reading of human nature and the media. Instead, the facts are doctored to tell a more believable story, to construct a more cohesive narrative. In other words, the interaction between the media and the Western public is not as much a “let me tell you”, but “I told you”. Compare the Tibetan story to that of Georgia—the media report on the conflict in that confusingly-named part of the world, at least initially, was a lot more tentative.

Without an opinionated media, the public would be at a loss of how to interpret events happened outside their sphere of senses. But equally true is that, without a readily receptive public, the media would not bother to invest in the effort to tell the story. This is another reason I do not think it is relevant to focus on who is or is not a racist.

I understand your criticism largely lay in my statement’s broad inclusion. I regret if it offended you. After this long contorted effort to explain myself, I hope you can see better where I came from,
or why I chose not to qualify my statement.

It has been exhaustive writing down my thoughts. But I find the experience very rewarding. For that, I want thank you for your participation in this dialogue, for your thoughtfulness and encouragement. I truly feel endebted.

Colin said something rather interesting yesterday: it is OK to have an unitary administrative structure and an authoritarian rule, or a decentralized structure and democracy. But China seems to have the wrong combination: a decentralized structure and an authoritarian rule. And this is a fiefdom pattern.

Thoughts: that echoes well with Pei Minxin’s “Trapped Transition”. The book didn’t make sense to me then because he was charging that China has degraded into predatory state. The latter definition sounds too much like Robert Bate’s Africa so I didn’t take it well. But I may need to take a second look at his argument. Particularly now that I have learned more about the local-center tension.

Colin also said something like the early Federalists didn’t care for party politics. Probably should follow up more on the Federalists thought and early American ethos. That also conforms to Confucius’ saying “????”, although I am already a convert of the instituational argument for the party system.

??????,?”???????”. ?????, ???????????????5?????”??”.

??“??”???? ?????“????”:

“… ??????????????????????????????4??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????“6·28”????“????”… ??“??”?????????????????????????????google?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????”

????????”????????”. Although the title was inaccurate (Weng An is not part of the Gui Yang municipality), the connection may not be far off. But that is just fascinating!

1. China has had few (none notable enough that I read) semi-free elections (i.e. direct vote and open candidacy) beyond village level. That is something Whiting drilled into our heads. So how significant is this event?

2. The change of procedure comes right after a widely reported riot and amidst widespread cynicism, I don’t know whether this is a sign of weakness/desparation or that of confidence? How much this is used as a ploy to defuse tension, or is this an instance where local reformers/a new generation of leaders are trying to find space to maneuver?

3. Isn’t this an unique opportunity to measure/observe how ready (local) civic culture is to reshape politics? The setting is perfect: something dramatic is happening in the political periphery, like ????, ????, Deng’s reform, etc. If a participatory and disciplined civil culture is there but dormant under suppression, then this is an opportunity where a new equilibrium (it may take a long while) may form. However, if there is no such a civic culture, the vacuum will be soon re-filled by petty despotism.

What would Elizabeth Perry say?

Recently have heard couple of people implying current Chinese leadership don’t know how the country was run prior to 1949. R. Bin Wong and couple of professors mentioned that during a talk and just read similiar sentiment in Perry and Goldman’s Grassroots Political Reform … book.

Does that mean there is lack of serious study on past state-society relationship? Even lack of knowledge of governance style/tradition? It is hard to believe but somehow I felt there is more to it …

Just a reminder.

Hypothesis:

1. If, in the long run, an economy features a liquid financial market, it is likely the economy is efficient.
(Liquidity: index of expected profitability by market participants; Efficiency: rate of utilization of resources and factors)
2. This is so because in general people tend to trust other participants (even at arms length) so there is not lack of credit. Or trust and credit is a necessary condition of an efficient economy.
3. How to prove? The expressway test: sampling all cars’s speed readings on an expressway, the higher the standard deviation (higher variation of speed), the slower the average speed. People don’t know what to expect from other drivers, so drive defensively and cautiously.

Extension:
If the above were true, can the same be said about state and society?
But what is the equivalent of liquidity? Or what is the best index to measure the expected return on participating and submitting by polity participants? Level of participantion?
And what is the best index to measure political harmony? An Utilitarian statement of number of policies that benefit most people?

Reason is the same: trust=participation and participation leads to best outcome. Not quite sure.

What triggered:
In developing countries, many people are skeptical of their governments or people from other domains/communities. This leads to incredibly inefficient political life.

Pakistan said Bhutto was assassinated by al Qaida but speculations abound and no one is happy with the government’s explanation. How is national reconciliation or progress possible?

China’s paper-in-bans newstory: which one is true, who to believe? How can the problem be fixed?

Lippman (via S Huntington) said that the developing countries problem is, “they need to be governed”. Can we say “they need to learn to trust?”

Also links Putnam’s social capital and Foucault’s disciplinary effect: higher social capital=higher self-discipline or submission.

NYT used the title “The Show of Emotion Heard ’Round the Presidential Campaign World” to describe Hillary’s near-breakdown a couple of days ago. Now that Hillary just won N.H., even her campaign manager acknowledges that a little “humanization” helped a lot.

Thoughts:
1. The reason many people don’t like Hillary is because she made herself non-connectable. People are not able to look at her and say, I know how she feels. For anyone who has suffered as much public humiliation and attacks as she has should feel angry and insecure. But not Hillary. All we are looking for is a little “princess-ness” in her, but she just singlemindedly worked herself up as the widowed-career-woman-turned-mother-in-law of America.

2. For the above-stated reason, I hope Hillary fails. Because she may win but she may never have a mandate. If people cannot connect to her, they won’t lend her goodwill or benefit of doubts. That just leaves door to endless partisan gridlock: what if the Republicans in the Congress don’t hand her any victory in her first 100 days–without knowing any details, who would most people likely to blame? But what if it is someone who is more personally appealing?

3. Doesn’t this argument work in a boarder context, say state and society? Can we say that if people get what they expected, they are more likely to obey the rules? That goes back to one of the first questions Migdal asked in our class, “why people are waiting at traffic light in the middle of the night?” Doesn’t expectation come from “connection”? I know it is a little fuzzy here … need to work on the logic more … heyhey

4. What does Obama’s “Change” mean? I suspect it is a masquerade for the resentment toward the war and the Bush administration. Is it likely that many of those who voted for Obama (the young and the first-timers) also agitated against the war? And they realized that the anger cannot cash out in Congress so they took it out on Hillary (aka the establishment)? I certainly hope so.

This is a title of a NYT article. The author says,

“The answer, say people who have studied the country’s regulatory system, is a cautious yes. ”

Not mine. My prediction is that any “reform” in food/drug safety, if it ever materialize, will likely come at the expense of the rural poor. In other words, the pursue of a “cleaner life” is only to widen the gap between the rich and the poor.

Here is why: first, China today is not Chicago during the Progressive Era. Second, Chinese leadership is held hostage by the quiet barrons.

When Sinclair Lewis witnessed the carcass floating down Charles River, he could write about it and get his articles published. More importantly, when Teddy Roosevelt decided to act, he did not have to get the consent from the mayor of Chicago.

But today, although the world economies have integrated, the world regulatory agencies have not. Therefore, Americans suffering from poor product safety in China can do little to change the situation. Any American Joe can write about food safety in China, but at the end of the day, FDA can’t bypass the Chinese government to enforce even common-sense rules.

Now that Americans have little leverage over the safety issue, how about the Chinese?

The central government, of course, likes nothing more than a pristine image while its representatives strolling down the hallway of United Nations. However, how much control does the central government have?

It is becoming obvious that the central government is losing control over the nation’s economic life. The Premier may shed tears for deceased coal miners, the central government may chop off the heads of some senior officials, yet the weight of an entire state may not be enough to stop a county bank to lend loans to a doomed business.

In fact, I heard that the very author of this article, Joseph Khan, was once detained in ShenZhen while visiting a factory on a product safety assignment. Even the police could not get him freed. Doesn’t this story tell a bigger truth? The central government certainly wouldn’t like to see Mr. Khan got hurt, yet the state appeared powerless in front of strong local business interest.

One last thing, Khan said,
“… big Chinese cities have already demonstrated that they can do a better job monitoring food and drug safety than less developed counties and rural areas. ”
Sure, big citites don’t manufacture those goods. Therefore, they can afford to behave as Americans do by boycutting certain products. Yet the factories still have to run and the laborers have to be employed. While the production happens in rural area but the cities refuse to buy the products, so who are left to consume those tainted goods? That is what I mean “the pursue of a “cleaner life” is only to widen the gap between the rich and the poor.”

It is getting too late … but want to keep the following thoughts:
I was listening to Diane Rhem while hiking up Mailbox Peak, heard couple stories that triggered the following thoughts:
1. What’s the difference between a documentary film maker and a propagandist? The story was about Leni Riefenstahl. NYKr also had a profilt/book review on her recently. Some people are still very upset and called her a criminal. But really, what was she? A propagandist or a film maker? Did she make up anything in Triumph of Will that did NOT happen in the summer of 1934 Nuremberg? As far as I can recall, it is a silent movie so there can’t be any misleading statement. Isn’t this all about interpretation (i.e. presentation of “reality”)? Knowledge is never only a collection of factual truth, but how they are related and organized. No documentary film maker is not a story-teller. The same can be said about a propagandist.
2. Turkey: the secular and the religous conflicts. I was just wondering: how can a paternalistic and authoritative institution as the military safeguarding secular democracy? Kemal Ataturk apparently didn’t trust either the efficacy of democracy or the nature of Turkish people, so he decided to use state violence as the final guarantee. This is kind of unique and strange, I suddenly realized. Nevertheless, living in an increasingly religious and moralistic America, the Turk’s faith in secularism is both refreshing and admirable.

Is state an independent variable?
Can a political institution survive in the long run if the political culture get its meanings from the political institution, but not from cultural meanings?
For example, the Soviet political culture was based on an ideaology. After the breakup, the new institution rely on Russian culture.
Iraqi P.C. was centered on Sadam and Baathism. Once the bubble burst, it found itself lack of underlying cultural coherence.
In this regard, it is hard to say “strong state, weak society” but should be the other way around.

“In fact, there is a civil war in progress in Iraq, one comparable in important respects to other civil wars that have occurred in postcolonial states with weak political institutions.”
-http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070301faessay86201/james-d-fearon/iraq-s-civil-war.html?mode=print
Is it because institutions weak or lack of coherent meanings?